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more important than physical pain (WWB I, p. 299).2 He notes with ap-
proval that in cases of intense mental suffering, the self-infliction of physi-
cal pain serves as a useful diversion (the contrast here with Elaine Scarry s
discussion throughout The Body in Pain of  the annihilating power of
pain to  utterly nullify the claims of the world suggests that Schopen-
hauer does not take seriously enough the formidable potential of physical
pain). The premise that physical pain is unworthy of much attention, as
academic and implausible as it may seem, might intuitively emerge as a
good reason to show leniency toward the brand of pleasure which results
from observing a harmless slip on a banana peel. Schopenhauer, however,
does not open this door.
Consider once more Baudelaire s view of comedy. Baudelaire agrees
with his contemporary Schopenhauer about Schadenfreude and explains
at greater detail why we should condemn the emotion. Claiming that  hu-
man laughter is intimately linked with the accident of an ancient fall in
 the orthodox mind, 3 Baudelaire concludes that  the comic is a damnable
element, and one of diabolic origins (note that teuflisch is generally
translated as  diabolic ). He asks:
I said that laughter contained a symptom of failing . . . and [was]
prompted by the sight of someone else s misfortune. . . . This mis-
fortune is almost always a mental failing. And can you imagine a
phenomenon more deplorable than one failing taking delight in an-
other? (p. 138)
For Baudelaire all laughter signifies Schadenfreude. Baudelaire holds that
bad though it may be to take pleasure when someone else has misunder-
stood something or failed to grasp it altogether, it is even worse for the
Wicked Feelings 79
 orthodox mind to take pleasure in, for example, the sight of a man
falling on the ice or in the street.
It is interesting to note that the examples Baudelaire chooses do not in-
volve suffering such as would result from mutilations or rapes, but rather
slipping on the ice or coming up with incorrect answers to mathematical
problems. The concept of suffering is perplexing and analytically inade-
quate, and in assessing the moral status of human reactions to it, close at-
tention must be paid to whatever detail is provided to qualify it. A single
parenthetical clause of Baudelaire s is of crucial importance here. Of pain
which evokes delight, he claims:  ce malheur est presque toujours une
faiblesse d esprit (p. 530). This clause goes far toward answering such
impossibly difficult questions as  What is the dividing line between trivial
and important pain? and  At what point does celebration of suffering
become cruelty? Baudelaire circumvents these questions by expanding
upon the logic we find ambiguously expressed by Schopenhauer.
What Baudelaire is trying to do is extend the boundaries of moral con-
demnation, which would naturally include pleasure in others relatively
serious (mental) suffering, to pleasure in their relatively minor (mental)
suffering as well. In this Baudelaire and Schopenhauer would seem to
share a common goal. Baudelaire, however, is clearer in his exposition. It
might seem reasonable to conclude with Baudelaire that only a hardened,
cruel person could take pleasure from the physical pain of others: even if
it does, it is more difficult to condemn those who take pleasure in the
mental failings of others in the same terms.
Because the extent of a person s contribution to an act has always been
a standard touchstone of moral evaluation, the examples upon which each
thinker fastens are illuminating. Whereas Baudelaire s two examples of suf-
fering (slipping on ice, erring in arithmetic) both involve activity, Schopen-
hauer s do not. The examples of  permanent evils which Schopenhauer
offers concern for the most part circumstances into which we are born,
not episodic failings (having a  bad heart stands as an obvious excep-
tion). The former category of examples excludes the happiness of antici-
pation, the latter category does not.
Certainly, Schopenhauer abhors the pleasure of anticipation that pre-
cedes evil acts; it is curious that his examples of great suffering do not
80 When Bad Things Happen to Other People
leave room for it. It makes no sense to say that we cannot wait for some-
one to live a life of poverty or to be born lame. Baudelaire s more robust
exposition captures worrisome designs. Waiting eagerly for another to fall
on his face, or setting a trap in order to make him fall on his face, bothers
us more than simply noticing with approval that someone has fallen. The
question of agency will prove pivotal in the course of isolating Schaden-
freude as a particular emotional response, for we generally hold people
morally responsible for a state of affairs insofar as they have brought
about that state of affairs (the implication being that those who happily
anticipate some suffering are more likely to contribute to or otherwise en-
courage suffering).
Schopenhauer s disregard for distinctions of kind leads him to view
suffering as essentially monolithic. Schopenhauer ennobles and sanctifies
suffering, all suffering. In The World as Will and Representation Schopen-
hauer depicts human existence as early Buddhist literature does: a state of
inextinguishable suffering. Like Buddha, Schopenhauer sees in the insa-
tiable will the cause of all suffering. Schopenhauer holds that there is no
important difference between various instances of suffering (I, p. 309). We
should notice at once that the transient feeling of wounded vanity appears
on a par with the spectacle of the brutal murder of someone we care
about:
The ceaseless efforts to banish suffering achieve nothing more than
a change in its form. This is essentially want, lack, care for the
maintenance of life. If, which is very difficult, we have succeeded in
removing pain in this form, it at once appears on the scene in a
thousand others, varying according to age and circumstance, such
as sexual impulse, passionate love, jealousy, envy, hatred, anxiety,
ambition, avarice, sickness, and so on. Finally, if it cannot find en-
try in any other shape, it comes in the sad, grey garment of weari-
ness, satiety, and boredom, against which many different attempts
are made. Even if we ultimately succeed in driving these away, it
will hardly be done without letting pain in again in one of the pre-
vious forms, and thus starting the dance once more at the begin-
ning. (WWR I, p. 315)
Wicked Feelings 81
Depressing as all this sounds, it is also quite disappointing to realize that a
thinker compelled to pose such distinctly interesting questions could come
up with such a dissatisfying answer to them. Without referring to
Schopenhauer, Freud (whose admiration for Schopenhauer is well known)
remarks in Civilization and Its Discontents:  If we cannot remove all suf-
fering, we can remove some, and we can mitigate some: the experience of
many thousands of years has convinced us of that. 4 Schopenhauer s pes-
simistic resignation to suffering calls for self-destruction. Although suicide
can be taken as a manifestation of frustrated vitality, still it remains that
the onset of a desire for self-destruction signifies, or ought to signify,
something alarming about that vitality. If to care genuinely about another
person is to encourage escape from the unrelenting suffering of the world
through self-destruction, then the sort of reverence for suffering Schopen-
hauer exhorts is deeply problematic. The approval of suicidal fantasies or
desires might thinly veil his own desire for self-destruction. Misery loves
company, but does it prefer destruction? Schopenhauer s own avoidance
of suicide suggests ambivalence on this point.
Schopenhauer s view of suffering as monolithic lives on. In his work
What Evil Means to Us, C. Fred Alford declares: [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]

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